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Executive Summary
The environment in which national space
activities are conducted has changed
significantly in recent years. Technological
advances, domestic and foreign policy shifts,
economic constraints, and international
competition all have affected priorities in the
space program and increased options for
achieving objectives. This dynamic
environment for space activities has important
implications for future facilities needs. The
National Facilities Study (NFS), initiated in
1992 and completed in May 1994, represents
an interagency effort to develop a compre-
hensive and integrated long-term plan for
world-class aeronautical and space facilities
that meet current and projected needs for
commercial and government aerospace
research and development (R&D) and space
operations.
At the request of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the
Department of Defense (DoD), the National
Research Council's Committee on Space
Facilities has reviewed the space related
findings of the NFS.I Given the relatively
short time available for the NFS task team
and working groups to pull together much
information and analysis about the current
space facilities infrastructure, the National
Research Council committee believes that
many aspects of the study were performed
very well. The inventory of more than 2,800
facilities will be an important resource,
especially if it continues to be updated and
maintained as the NFS report recommends.
The data in the inventory provide the basis
for a much better understanding of the
resources available in the national facilities
I The aeronautics facilities aspects of the NFS are being
reviewed by the Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board, whose findings are described in a separate report.
infrastructure, as well as extensive infor-
mation on which to base rational decisions
about current and future facilities needs.
The working groups have used the
inventory data and other information to make
a set of recommendations that include
estimates of cost savings and steps for
implementation. The recommendations for
change are well reasoned, as far as they go,
and merit implementation. However, the
NFS space facilities recommendations are
driven by current budget constraints rather
than a careful and reasoned attempt to predict
long-term needs. Although tight federal
budgets provide a strong incentive for greater
interagency cooperation and for reducing the
number of facilities, they provide little
incentive for long-term planning. Without a
well-articulated nhtional space policy on
which to base facilities requirements,
emphasis inevitably gets placed on reducing
annual operating costs by closing some
facilities while modifying and consolidating
others. This emphasis is reflected in the NFS
space facilities recommendations.
If the NFS is ultimately to respond to the
questions posed to its task team, additional
work is needed to assess facilities needs in
the context of realistic long-term national
aspirations in space. In particular, more work
is needed in four areas: (1) the requirements
models described in the NFS, (2)the
efficiencies possible from a serious analysis
and realignment of agency roles and missions
and management practices, (3) the low level
of industrial participation in the space
facilities aspects of the NFS, and (4)the
implications of future international
competition and cooperation for domestic
space facilities.
2 Space Facilities: Meeting Future Needs
Requirements Models
The NFS baseline model for commercial,
civil, and military space systems needs is
based on other recent mission models and
conforms to current budgetary and policy
decisions. It contains no new major missions
or vehicles and, therefore, the NFS task team
assumes that no major changes in launch
facilities or research facilities are needed. The
excursion model has some new missions and
vehicles, but its implications on facilities are
not addressed in the NFS.
The assumption in the baseline model that
the status quo will be maintained for the next
30 years is not conducive to a rigorous
analysis of future facilities needs. In fact, it is
more likely that the space program will
undergo major changes in direction and scope
during that period. The excursion model is
more indicative of what is likely to be needed
during this 30-year period, since it explores
the development of some new facilities and
technology.
Roles and Missions
The NFS recognizes the importance of
reviewing and modifying roles and missions
within and across agencies and calls for
further study. However, possible realign-
ments of roles and missions, and their
implications for facilities requirements and
costs, did not receive thorough analysis. For
instance, opportunities to consolidate activ-
ities of the NASA centers, to consolidate
Shuttle hardware activities at Kennedy Space
Center, and to streamline Air Force launch
operations are not sufficiently evaluated in the
NFS. The NFS also pays inadequate
attention to areas in which management
practices have detrimental effects on
operational efficiency.
Industrial Participation
Although there was some participation by
industry in the facilities inventory, and some
effort to gather industry input, the focus of
the NFS is almost exclusively on
government-owned space facilities. The task
groups believed that market forces would
dictate decisions on private facilities; indeed,
a number have been closed as the aerospace
industry retrenches. But current market
incentives are such that considerable excess
capacity in space facilities may remain. The
high costs of closing facilities and the need
for contractors to demonstrate that facilities
are in place to be competitive on contract bids
work together to keep excess facilities open.
International Competition and
Cooperation
Foreign facilities will affect U.S. space
operations and R&D efforts either by
providing opportunities for cooperation or by
increasing competition with U.S. facilities
and setting standards for cost, reliability, and
capability. Many foreign launch facilities are
newer and, having benefited from American
experience, are designed for operational
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Foreign
R&D facilities also are improving. The
possibility that international competition and
cooperation will affect U.S. space facilities
requirements, including potential U.S.
reliance on foreign facilities, has not been
explicitly addressed in the NFS.
Recommendations
Given the committee's assessment of the
mission and requirements models and the
NFS analysis of space facilities using the
models, much more work should be done to
determine national space facilities needs
based on more realistic long-term objectives.
The committee recognizes that the ability to
develop more realistic national space
objectives ideally depends on clear policy
decisions and budgetary commitments to
back those decisions. However, a better
assessment of future facilities needs is still
possible in their absence. It should be based
not only on current trends in technology,
international competition, and industry, but
also on innovative approaches to meeting
mission requirements. Such an assessment
would highlight policy alternatives and
opportunities to improve the nation's space
facilities infrastructure.
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The committee, therefore, first
recommends that NASA and DoD conduct a
second phase or follow-on study. A goal of
this study should be not only to illuminate the
savings possible from changes in the space
facilities infrastructure but also to illustrate
the potential to enhance the nation's ability to
meet its objectives based on more effective
utilization of facilities. 2
The committee has identified several
broad areas that should form the nucleus of
this follow-on study. (Additional specific
elements that should be addressed in the next
phase of the NFS are detailed in the
committee's recommendations.)
• The baseline requirements model
should be revised to include a set of potential
vehicle options and the facilities that would
be required to support them. There are a
number of possible approaches currently
being evaluated to upgrade and modernize
U.S. launch capabilities. These approaches
include single stage to orbit, liquid and solid
technologies, and hybrids of the two. Future
facilities needs should take into consideration
innovative approaches to reduce operational
costs. Such approaches were lacking in the
NFS.
• The roles and missions currently
allocated within and between NASA and DoD
facilities should be reassessed. Where
changes in roles and missions also would
enable more efficient, effective use of
facilities, such facility changes should be
recommended.
• The incentives and disincentives
facing the aerospace industry that are related
to facilities should be identified. A broad set
of issues, including tax policy, accounting
requirements, and contracting procedures,
should be addressed to generate a compre-
hensive picture of industry's facilities
investment behavior. These issues can only
be solved by securing much greater industry
participation in the process of reviewing
national space facilities. Such issues might be
covered in any future survey of industry's
needs as well.
• Finally, appropriate interactions with
foreign countries need to be explicitly
examined. The follow-on study should have
a clear international element that documents
current major R&D and operational facilities
abroad, projects likely future capabilities
relative to the United States, and identifies
conditions under which cooperation is likely
or even preferred and those under which
separate U.S. capabilities are essential.
Because a broad revision of roles and
missions could result in extensive changes in
facilities requirements and workloads, and
would likely raise political concerns,
consideration should be given to establishing
a presidential commission, analogous to the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission,
to help generate the political consensus
necessary to close and consolidate some
facilities.
Conclusion
While, in today's budget-conscious
environment, it is natural that the NFS
focused on cost reduction and consolidations,
such a study is most useful to future planning
if it gives equal weight to guiding the
direction of future facilities needed to satisfy
legitimate national aspirations. Even in the
context of cost reduction through facilities
closures and consolidations, the study is
timid about recognizing and proposing
program changes and realignments of roles
and missions to capture what could be
significant savings and increased effec-
tiveness. The recommendations of the
Committee on Space Facilities are driven by
the clear need to be more realistic and precise
both in recognizing current incentives and
disincentives in the aerospace industry and in
forecasting future conditions for U.S. space
activities.
2 Such a study could build on the current review of NASA
and other government laboratories that is being coor-
dinated by the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

1Introduction
BACKGROUND
The United States' efforts in space began
as a natural progression from national
programs in aeronautics. In the 1950s,
significant funding impetus for the space
program resulted as an outgrowth of the Cold
War, and continued national support was
maintained as the space program became a
visual symbol of U.S. technical competence.
With the termination of the Cold War, the
largest space development agencies, the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), have been called
upon to demonstrate the relevance and
effectiveness of their space programs. The
Cold War's end coincided with a period of
unprecedented federal budget deficits. In a
time of severely constrained budgets, the
space program faces challenges of
accomplishing significant scientific and
technical goals while fulfilling international
commitments, maintaining national security
objectives, and maintaining a competitive
commercial posture.
Recognizing the importance of national
test and operational facilities in maintaining a
strong aerospace sector, as well as the
potential economic benefit from possible
closings and consolidations, Daniel S.
Goldin, Administrator of NASA, initiated the
National Facilities Study in 1992. He
contacted top officials in the DoD, the
Department of Energy, the Department of
Transportation, the Department of
Commerce, and the National Science
Foundation, inviting them to participate in the
development of a comprehensive and
integrated long-term plan for future aerospace
facilities. The leadership of these government
agencies nominated individuals to serve on an
oversight group and to provide support to an
interagency task team. The task team,
organized into four task groups, was charged
with developing a coordinated national plan
for world-class aeronautical and space
facilities that meet current and projected needs
for commercial and government research and
development (R&D) and space operations)
NASA and DoD subsequently requested
that the Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board (ASEB) of the National Research
Council review and critique the requirements
and facility approaches presented in the NFS.
The board was asked to assess the extent to
which the interagency task team considered
alternative facility approaches and to
recommend any further actions or studies that
should be pursued by the interagency group.
To address the space portions of this request,
the National Research Council Committee on
Space Facilities was formed. (The
committee's Statement of Task appears as
Appendix A.)
This report responds to Phase 1 of the
Statement of Task. It conveys the
committee's findings, conclusions, and
recommendations:
The committee has focused only on the
relevant volumes of the NFS. These include
Volume 1: Facilities Inventory, Volume 3:
Mission and Requirements Model, Volume 4:
3 See, "Terms of Reference, National Facility Plan
Development", National Facilities Study Summary
Report, p. 24.
4 Phase 2 of the committee's Statement of Task may or
may not be undertaken depending on the needs of the
sponsor and any further work that may be done by the
interagency task team.
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Space Operations, and Volume 5:
R&D.
APPROACH
Space
In addressing its task, the Committee on
Space Facilities met in Washington, D.C. on
December 9-10, 1993; February 7-8, 1994;
and March 9-10, 1994. The committee
received briefings on the work of the
interagency task team, on the progress of
several studies regarding national launch
needs that were underway at the time of the
space facilities task groups' work, on
congressional and administration interests,
and from interested individuals in industry.
Subsequently, drafts were exchanged and
teleconferences held to finalize this report on
the committee's findings and recommen-
dations.
. .,, _,, _" '.'._
2The Environment
CIVIL AND MILITARY
APPROACHES TO FACILITIES
The United States' space program always
has been a combination of military and civil
activities, with relatively sporadic cooperation
and coordination between the two sectors. As
mandated by the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, NASA primarily manages
civil scientific and human space missions; the
DoD, primarily the Air Force and the
National Reconnaissance Office, manages
military and intelligence applications of
space. 5 As the civil and military space sectors
have independently grown over more than 35
years, distinct management cultures and
operating procedures have emerged.
One tangible manifestation of these
cultural differences has been the way facilities
have been created and managed. When
NASA was first formed, the agency acquired
some existing laboratories and facilities,
which had a history of integrated operations
ranging from research to building and testing
equipment; additional test and R&D facilities
were added over time. This initial experience
created an historical preference within NASA
to build needed facilities in-house. As these
facilities have become more numerous and
complex, NASA has hired contractors to
operate some of them, but NASA's facilities
remain predominantly owned by NASA. One
result of this approach to facilities has been
some duplication of capabilities and dis-
persion of effort across NASA centers.
DoD, in contrast, has encouraged and
often funded contractors to build their own
facilities as part of the requirements for
specific contracts. There are some DoD-
5 A few other agencies have been responsible for
specific types of payloads, such as the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration's
responsibility for weather satellites, but the bulk of
federal funding and management responsibility has
rested with NASA and DoD.
owned facilities, but the majority of military
space facilities are contractor owned and
operated. Encouraging contractors to build
facilities in order to bid competitively has led
to a proliferation of industry's facilities and,
in some companies, significant excess
capacity, especially in the current budget
environment.
These historic preferences affect
operations philosophies. NASA centers,
such as Marshall and Goddard Space Flight
Centers, as well as the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, have some capability to design,
develop, build, and test space hardware
themselves. With this capability, NASA can
act as both supplier and customer for its test
facilities. Often contractors funded by NASA
use NASA test facilities. DoD, in contrast,
generally expects contractors to have the
facilities necessary to meet contractual
requirements and therefore relies on industry
for its facilities needs.
These two distinct approaches to facilities
have important implications for the NFS. The
current inventory of space facilities includes a
combination of government-owned, govern-
ment-operated facilities (GOGOs), of which
the NASA centers are the best examples;
government-owned, contractor-operated
facilities (GOCOs), which include the
Palmdale and Downey, California Shuttle
facilities operated by Rockwell for NASA;
and contractor-owned, contractor-operated
facilities (COCOs), which include most of the
facilities of defense contractors. However,
the inventory and analysis in the NFS are
heavily weighted toward GOGO and GOCO
facilities. The result is that NFS recommen-
dations to close, consolidate, or modify
facilities tend to focus on NASA facilities,
while defense facilities are expected to be
managed by contractors as business decisions
taken in the context of rapidly shrinking
budgets.
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CHANGING FUNDING
ENVIRONMENT
The funding environment for both
military and civil space programs has been
affected by three main factors. First, the end
of the Cold War has caused major and
continuing reductions in defense budgets.
Second, political support for civil space
probably peaked with the Apollo program.
Third, efforts to reduce federal budget
deficits have increased pressure to cut most
federal program budgets, including space
programs. As a result, recent federal budgets
have not only increased the rate of reduction
in the DoD space budget but also have
inflicted real cuts in the civil space program.
DoD's space budget declined from a peak of
almost $18 billion in fiscal year 1988 to less
than $14 billion in fiscal year 1994. NASA's
budget grew from $9 billion in fiscal year
1988 to over $14 billion in fiscal year 1994, 6
but it is expected to decline to a little more
than $12 billion in fiscal year 1999, based on
five-year projections from the fiscal year
1995 President's budget request.
The impact of shrinking federal budgets
on the aerospace industry has been dramatic.
From 1988 to 1994, some 500,000 highly
trained workers left the payroll of the U.S.
aerospace industry. 7 However, the vast
infrastructure of space facilities developed
over the past 37 years has not been
commensurably reduced to fit the current
budget and industrial work force. Although
industry recognizes the existing overcapacity,
financial and business incentives sometimes
discourage closure and consolidation of space
facilities.
Within NASA and DoD, these budget
realities have had several major reper-
cussions. First, budgetary exigencies provide
a strong incentive for greater cooperation
among the civil, commercial, defense, and
national security space programs. Although
there has long been some civil and military
cooperation, for instance in the Shuttle
program, the current work of the national
6 Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 1993 Activities, Washington, D.C.: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, p. 98.
7 "Aerospace Employment by Product Group," Aerospace
Industries Association, December 15, 1993.
facilities task team is evidence that broader,
multiagency cooperation may be increasing.
Second, reduced budgets have forced the
need to critically evaluate the status quo. The
nation clearly has more resources for space
R&D and operations than it can afford and
less funding to meet future needs. "Right-
sizing" this infrastructure through consoli-
dation and closure of current facilities has
been the primary objective of the space
facilities task team.
Finally, declining budgets severely inhibit
the attention devoted to planning future space
needs. Because there is little confidence that
funding will be available, forward planning
has generally taken the form of modest
changes in the status quo, especially for
launch vehicles. This caution is reflected in
the NFS's conservative approach to advanced
planning for future facilities needs. The
situation raises the concern that budgetary
decisions could create a de facto national
space policy that could be detrimental to long-
term U.S. space capabilities.
U.S. SPACE STRATEGIES
Through the years, the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and other
national policies guided NASA's mission
pursuits. The agency focused on science
objectives and on demonstrating the nation's
technical prowess through the manned space
program. Although NASA has performed
strategic planning periodically in the past,
such agency-wide strategic planning often
was not supported through the budget
process. As a result, strategic direction was
in effect accomplished by the control of "new
starts" by both administrations and congress.
It should not be surprising that at times
NASA has encountered difficulties, because
its allotted budgets have not met its
commitments. Although NASA has instituted
a planning process that should help anticipate
future facility requirements for various
NASA enterprises, there has been no clearly
proclaimed and accepted national space policy
or overall mission statement that could
provide guidance for anticipating future
facility needs. The problem is not that
administrations have not articulated national
space policies; it is that these policies were
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not backed by budget actions and, therefore,
were often ignored. Accordingly, the flame
of reference for the space operations and
R&D facilities task groups primarily has been
the budget.
The DoD's space strategy has changed
over the past decade or so. In the early days
of DoD's space program at the height of the
Cold War, space was viewed as an
indispensable means of surveillance. As the
value of these early space assets became
clear, broader capabilities in communications,
battlefield management, weapons targeting,
and reconnaissance have been added. In
recent years, the trend has been to integrate
space systems into overall warfighting
capabilities and force structures. In fact, the
capabilities demonstrated in Operation Desert
Storm have raised demand for space systems
from warfighters in all of the military
services. The strategic focus, therefore, is to
capitalize on existing space assets, modernize
those assets, and learn to apply the resulting
capabilities virtually routinely to accomplish
military objectives. However, even under
these circumstances, budget realities are
forcing DoD to balance funding for space
systems against that for alternatives such as
aircraft. In DoD as well as NASA, budgetary
considerations are having a major impact on
space strategy.
THE U.S. SPACE MARKET
In the current environment of reduced
government spending on space programs and
the lack of clear articulation of long-term
national objectives in space, it is sometimes
assumed that growing commercial investment
will offset shrinking government funding.
Significant growth in the commercial space
sector could have repercussions for facilities
needs, so it is important to understand the
nature of the domestic space market and the
role of commercial space systems.
The overall U.S. space market can be
divided into four related but different areas,
plus launch vehicles, which are discussed
briefly below. These are human space
exploration, space science, military and
intelligence space systems, and commercial
space systems.
Human Space Exploration
NASA has been responsible for
launching men and women into space and
will continue to be in the future. Because of
environmental and safety requirements and
the extreme launch reliability mandated by the
presence of people, this market segment is
truly unique. The hardware is expensive,
complex, heavy, and therefore of limited use
to unmanned programs. The Shuttle is the
only vehicle now used for launching people.
Many expensive facilities, such as neutral
buoyancy tanks and centrifuges, are part of
the program for humans. This market
segment is entirely government funded.
Space Science and Applications
Most scientific satellites, space probes,
and observatories are funded by government,
so they face the same constraints as other
discretionary federal programs. Historically,
NASA has held the space science program
constant at about 20 percent of its budget,
which, if continued, will result in lower
funding as NASA's budget declines. 8
However, the trend toward smaller, cheaper
satellites may create opportunities for
commercial applications satellites, that is,
communications and remote sensing satel-
lites. For instance, there is growing
commercial interest in Earth observation
systems, which to date have depended on
government funding.
Military and Intelligence Space
Systems
Reductions in defense budgets in the last
few years have affected funding available for
military and intelligence space systems.
Lower spending is causing a significant
decrease in the number of military and
8 Some in Congress have expressed concern about the
direction of space science funding. When adjusted for
inflation, flat budgets for NASA amount to a 20 percent
decline in space science spending power over the next
four years, with particularly tight budgets for space
science at the end of the decade. See, for example, Liz
Tucci, "Flat Budget Forecasts Threaten Cuts in Science,"
Space News, April 18-24, 1994, p. 3.
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intelligence satellites being developed and
launched. (Ironically, these spending
reductions are occurring just as the full value
of space-based military capability is
becoming better understood, as was
demonstrated in the Persian Gulf.)
Commercial Space Systems
The commercial communications satellite
business appears to be relatively stable. The
trend toward miniaturization enables
increased capabilities on smaller spacecraft
operating in low Earth orbits. In terms of the
value of the commercial satellite business, a
decline in the number of large commercial
satellites could be partially offset by the
growth in small-satellite systems.
Several commercial firms are actively
developing small satellites (e.g., less than
500 kilograms) and associated small launch
vehicles. Although the growth in this
segment of the commercial space market is
large, it is small in absolute terms and is not
expected to stress facilities requirements for
some time.
Launch Vehicles
Because of the declining number of
projected satellite launches from the United
States and the smaller size of many
anticipated new satellite systems, there is
significant overcapacity in the medium and
large launch vehicle production base. 9
Growth in commercial launches will not
create sufficient demand to alleviate this
situation. Attempts by General Dynamics and
Martin Marietta to market commercial variants
of Atlas and Titan launch vehicles developed
for the government resulted in significant
losses to both companies.10Causes
contributing to the situation are obsolete,
manpower-intensive designs and subsidized
9 In both the United States and Russia, conversion of
ballistic missiles to provide low-cost launch vehicles
has been considered. However, the likely impact on
facilities would not be significant, and the committee did
not consider this issue germane to its charge.
10 Martin Marietta recently concluded its purchase of
General Dynamics' Space Systems Division.
foreign competition with modern, efficient
designs and modes of operation.
Analysis
The relative size of these five business
segments is important to understand.
Government spending in the military and civil
segments far exceeds industry spending in
the traditional commercial segment and the
emerging small-satellite segment. Currently,
the United States averages 30-40 launches
per year, of which approximately five are
purely commercial. By the end of the decade,
the total number of commercial launches
worldwide is estimated to be 18 per year, of
which only five or six are likely to use U.S.
launchers.ll Thus the launch vehicle segment
probably will continue to be predominantly
influenced by government requirements.
To further complicate the situation, with
stable or declining government spending the
number of launches will not be sufficient on
any given launcher to reduce per-launch
costs. Per-launch costs are determined by
both the costs of building the launcher and
the costs of operating the launch facility.
Fewer launches lower production rates
thereby reducing scale economies in the
manufacturing process. Fewer launches also
reduce the ability to amortize the high fixed
costs of operating and maintaining launch
facilities. The resulting higher launch costs
can consume funds that could otherwise be
available for new satellite systems devel-
opment, which will further reduce demand
for launches. This cycle can only be broken
if launch costs can be lowered significantly,
through large investments to improve the
efficiency of launch facilities or to develop
new launch technologies. The nation has thus
far been unwilling to make such investments.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Another major change in the conditions
facing the U.S. space community that will
have effects on facilities decisions is the
I1 Lt. Gen. Thomas Moorman, Jr., Chairman, DoD
Launch Modernization Study, briefing to the committee,
March 9, 1994.
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growth of foreign space capabilities. Today
the other major players in the world space
business are Russia, Europe (both through
the European Space Agency--a consortium
of 14 European nations--and through
individual national programs), China, and
Japan. Indigenous launch capabilities include
Russia's Proton, China's Long March, and
Europe's Ariane 4, which are the primary
competitors to U.S. launchers. In addition,
several European companies, such as British
Aerospace, Matra Marconi Space, and
Alenia, are highly competitive in the
communications satellite market.
The implications for the U.S. space
community of these strong and growing
foreign capabilities continue to unfold. For
both political and economic reasons, foreign
launchers are likely to garner increasing
global market share, particularly for com-
mercial launches. Despite international
agreements on fair pricing and limitations on
the number of launches that can be sold (e.g.,
in the case of Proton and Long March),
foreign launch services are often priced
below their American competitors. For large,
sophisticated satellites, the price of the launch
is probably less important than its reliability
and scheduling, but for smaller payloads,
launch prices may be the most significant
factor in choosing a launch supplier.
For government launch customers, who
dominate the launch market, domestic launch
vehicles and facilities will continue to be the
primary choice. In this sector, foreign
competition for launches is not a bona fide
threat, but the fact that foreign launchers are
priced lower demonstrates the possibilities
and highlights the inefficiencies of domestic
launch services. In a tightening budget
environment where high launch costs squeeze
out other spending, foreign capabilities may
provide an increasingly attractive alternative,
even for government customers.
SUMMARY
The environment in which national space
activities are conducted has changed
significantly in recent years. Technological
advances, domestic and foreign policy shifts,
economic constraints, and international
competition all have affected priorities in the
space program and increased options for
achieving objectives. These changing
conditions need to be considered explicitly
before any major decisions in facilities
planning can be made with confidence. The
relevant issues can be placed into four
categories.
1. The roles and missions of NASA and
DoD have evolved in a relatively
uncoordinated manner, resulting in different
operating cultures and approaches to
facilities. Declining budgets in both the civil
and military space programs will increase
pressure for greater cooperation among the
relevant agencies. Redefining and clarifying
their roles and missions offers opportunities
to reduce redundant facilities and increase
efficiencies, but cultural differences must be
recognized and managed to take advantage of
these opportunities effectively.
2. The United States has an excess of
space R&D facilities, a great number of
which are affiliated with DoD programs and
owned by industry. Even in the past
expanding space market, the capacity was
excessive, driven largely by the competitive
process and the desire of every large
developmental program to possess its own
testing capability. The U.S. government is
paying most of the cost of these facilities
through industry overhead. Initiatives to
close, consolidate, and modernize facilities
should consider these private facilities as well
as those owned by the government.
3. There are limits to the amount of
consolidation of space facilities that can be
undertaken without adverse effects on
efficiency and capabilities. Some redundancy
in R&D facilities is desirable to allow
competition that spurs innovative thinking
and to provide for contingencies. Some
redundancy is also justified in operations
facilities. For instance, the need for east- and
west-coast launch capabilities will continue
into the indefinite future, with obvious
duplication of supporting infrastructure.
U.S. launch facilities evolved over more than
30 years to support a large variety of
systems. Attempts to modify old equipment
to satisfy new requirements may respond to
near-term budget constraints but be
considerably more expensive in the long term
and vastly less efficient.
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4. A fluctuating and uncertain U.S.
launch vehicle posture makes future planning
difficult. Foreign competition has newer
facilities, is better focused for efficient
operations, and has lower prices. Innovative
approaches toward launch operations, a
subject not discussed in the NFS, will be key
to the future competitiveness of U.S. launch
capabilities.
In short, the environment within which
U.S. space programs are conducted poses
significant problems for planning. There is
no widely accepted, up-to-date national
strategy for dealing with issues that are truly
national in nature. 12 Against this
background, no decision seems final, and, as
a result, any long-term plan is viewed with
skepticism. Nonetheless, the many develop-
ments in the domestic and international
environments for space activities have created
unrelenting pressure for change. "Right-
sizing" the number and content of U.S. facil-
ities to support a reasonable range of space
program alternatives can be an important step
in the change process.
12 The Clinton Administration released a new U.S. space
launch policy on August 5, 1994 that calls for DoD to
update expendable launchers and NASA to develop new
launch technologies. Because it had not yet been an-
nounced, this policy did not appear to affect the NFS.
3The National Facilities Study
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
PROCESS
The NFS is an interagency cooperative
effort intended to:
• determine where U.S. facilities do not
meet national aerospace needs;
• define new facilities required to make
U.S. capabilities world class;
• define where consolidation and phase-
out of existing facilities is appropriate; and
• develop a long-term national plan for
world-class facility acquisition and shared
usage. 13
To accomplish these objectives, an
oversight group, chaired by John Dailey from
NASA and vice-chaired by Charles Adolph
from DoD, was formed to oversee the work
of the interagency task team, directed by
Richard Kline. The task team was organized
into task groups to examine aeronautics
R&D, space R&D, space operations facili-
ties, and facilities costing and engineering.
Each of these task groups was supported by
working groups in key specialty areas. The
task and working groups gathered infor-
mation on government and industry facilities
through interviews and inventory data
requests and met periodically during 1993
and early 1994. An industry forum was held
at Kennedy Space Center to gather specific
company comments.
The approach taken by the task and
working groups was simultaneously (1) to
define facilities needs based on civil, defense,
and commercial mission requirements, and
(2) to create a facilities inventory data base
that included NASA, DoD, other
13 These objectives were described to the committee in a
briefing by Richard Kline, NFS Task Team director,
February 7, 1994.
government, and industrial facilities. The task
groups then analyzed the resulting data,
comparing facility needs with existing
capabilities to determine areas of overlap and
underutilization, as well as shortfalls and
gaps. It is important to note that this analysis
focused on government-owned facilities. 14
The assessment of facilities needs is
based on two mission requirements models, a
baseline model and an excursion model. Each
model includes projections for the civil,
commercial, and defense market sectors.
These requirements models are largely based
on the results obtained in similar recent
studies, such as the Civil Needs Data Base
developed as part of the NASA Access to
Space Study and the Bottom-Up Review of
the DoD conducted in 1993. The baseline
requirements model assumes that there will
be only selected upgrades to the current
expendable launch vehicle (ELV) and Shuttle
fleet, and current programs such as Mission
to Planet Earth will continue. Excursions to
the baseline envision a new cargo-carrying
vehicle, a shuttle replacement, and a next-
generation launch system (i.e., single stage to
orbit). It also envisions launch of the next
generation of great observatories, continued
military uses, and overall growth in
commercial uses of space.
The inventory data base was developed
by NASA using a modified version of the Air
Force Integrated Technology and Assessment
System, which is used to track space
hardware. The inventory is intended to
capture relevant R&D and operations facilities
in all government agencies and industry. At
this writing, 78 sites had been surveyed
14 According to a briefing to the committee on
December 10, 1993, the NFS did not address contractor-
owned facilities because the task groups believed market
forces would dictate consolidations and closures of
private facilities.
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(11 NASA, 30 DoD, 10 Department of
Energy, 3 National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration, and 24 indus-
try), containing 1,500 buildings and over
2,800 facilities. (Table 3-1 lists the types of
facilities in the inventory.) Data requested
include general information on name,
location, size, replacement value, utilization
rate, type specifications, and performance
parameters. Contacts for additional infor-
mation are also included for each entry.
Table 3-1: Facilities Inventory
Category 2: Further study is required; the
necessary analysis and evaluation are still in
progress.
Category 3: No recommendations were
made due to lack of data, insufficient time to
assess the data, or, in some instances, an
initial assessment determined that no signifi-
cant cost savings could be realized.
All the facilities described in the inventory
data base have not been evaluated. Selection
for analysis was based on data availability,
Assembly
Command Destruct
Communications
Computational Support/Computer
Operations
Data Archive/Storage
Environmental Simulation/Experimentation
Flight Experiment Ground Support (e.g.,
Clean Room)
Human Factors/Biomedical
Landing Operations
Launch
Launch Processing/Operations
Launch Processing/Booster
Launch Processing/Ordnance
Manufacturing
Materials
Mission Operations
On-Orbit Mission Control Centers
Operational Simulation/Demonstration
Operations
Payload Operations
Processing
Propulsion Testing
Range
Recovery Operations
Research Laboratory
Rocket Propulsion Ground Test Facility
Support
Test Chambers
Test Stands
Test Beds
Tracking and Data Acquisition
Training
Wind Tunnels
Based on the mission requirements
models, the inventory findings, and addi-
tional information gathered through site visits
and other studies, the task and working
groups assessed opportunities for closure,
consolidation, and joint use of government
facilities, as well as needed modifications/
upgrades and new facilities. These assess-
ments are presented in a series of recommen-
dations on specific facilities, which fall into
the following categories:
Category 1: Assesses the capabilities and
condition of the facility and develops a firm
recommendation----consolidate, close, modi-
fy, transfer, enhance, or no change.
1A: Recommends changes to the
status quo or advocates continuing changes
that are consistent with NFS objectives.
1B: Recommends no change.
experience and knowledge of team members,
and selected site visits by the working
groups.
Overall, the members of the task team
concluded that mission requirements for the
next 30 years can be met with existing
facilities, with only minor upgrades and
maintenance required. They also concluded
that the excursions to the baseline can be met
with upgrades and modifications to current
facilities. Exceptions would be for extended
time on the Moon or human exploration of
Mars. In addition, they found overcapacity in
some areas of space R&D facilities that could
be alleviated through a single national
management authority responsible for
coordinating usage and pricing. The task
team emphasized the point that significant
savings from closure and consolidation of
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facilities to reduce overcapacity can only
result by reducing personnel. The point was
also made that further review of the roles and
missions of the various agencies engaged in
space activities could provide the basis for
significant cost reductions in the future. The
NFS summary recommendations are included
in Appendix B.
GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
INTERAGENCY REPORT
Given the relatively short time available to
the task team and working groups to pull
together much information and analysis about
the current space facilities infrastructure, the
Committee on Space Facilities believes that
many aspects of the study were performed
very well. The inventory of more than 2,800
facilities will be an important resource
especially if it continues to be updated and
maintained as the NFS report recommends.
Although some important facilities, such as
the new Earth-Observing Satellite Landsat
command and receiving ground station in
Oklahoma and facilities for simulating the
natural radiation environment, are not
included, and more work is needed to include
as many industry facilities as possible, the
initial effort to construct the inventory has
been strong. The data in the inventory
provide the basis for a much better under-
standing of the resources available in the
national facilities infrastructure and extensive
information on which to base rational
decisions about current and future facilities
needs.
The working groups have used the
inventory data and other information to make
a set of well-reasoned recommendations that
include estimates of cost savings and steps
for implementation. Because of the current
budget environment, however, the require-
ments models used by the task team envision
very little change from the status quo. The
recommendations for facilities changes based
on these models, therefore, are timid. For in-
stance, in the case of space operations facili-
ties, only 17 percent of the 912 facilities
inventoried are affected by the 40 category
1A recommendations for change, while 45
percent received 1B (No Change) recom-
mendations; the remaining 38 percent were
category 2 or 3, with no change recom-
mended pending further study or more
data. 15
In the recommendations for change, the
emphasis is on reducing annual operating
costs by closing some facilities while
modifying and consolidating others. Though
the potential savings from changes in roles
and missions are recognized, such changes
are not addressed. Similarly, improving the
use of facilities through more consistent
pricing policies is a recognized need, but the
NFS only suggests further study. Although
some new facilities requirements are
articulated, the committee believes that there
is too little attention to future needs to fulfill
that aspect of the NFS objectives.
This general critique of the NFS underlies
the Committee on Space Facilities' assess-
ment of the effort. Although the committee
recognizes the importance of cutting costs,
the space facilities analysis is not well
balanced between the restrained approach
driven by shrinking budgets and the future
vision needed to begin planning for new and
upgraded facilities. Some of the needed
future analysis could be accomplished by
additional reviews; this includes the review
of roles and missions to generate future
efficiencies and the review of other policies
such as pricing. Systematic studies of both of
these issues are major recommendations of
the task team with which this committee
strongly agrees.
If the NFS is ultimately to respond to the
questions posed to the task team, more
attention to long-term issues, particularly
innovative approaches to meeting long-term
national objectives in space, is a necessity.
The following chapter presents this
committee's views and recommendations on
specific issues that deserve more attention.
15 Space Operations Facilities Task Group, National
Facilities Study, Volume 4, Section II.

4Issues, Findings, and Recommendations
The Committee on Space Facilities
reviewed working drafts and the final reports
of the NFS. The committee heard briefings
from members of the working groups and
task team, as well as from other experts with
important views relevant to the environment
for and objectives of the NFS. Based on this
information, the committee believes that the
NFS represents a good start at addressing
long-neglected issues regarding the national
space infrastructure. The recommendations
for change are well reasoned, as far as they
go, and merit implementation. Additional
work is needed, however, and a few areas
did not receive the attention this committee
believes they deserve. These areas include (1)
the requirements models described in the
NFS, (2) the efficiencies possible from a
serious analysis and realignment of agency
roles and missions and management prac-
tices, (3) the level of industrial participation
in the space facilities aspects of the NFS, and
(4) the implications of future international
competition and cooperation for domestic
space facilities.
REQUIREMENTS
In an ideal world, facility requirements
would be determined through a process that
would begin with a national space policy and
proceed through agency strategic plans to
planned programs that would require a set of
facility capabilities. Since such long-range
policy and plans do not currently exist, the
interagency task team used baseline and
excursion mission requirements models that
are based on recent studies and policy
decisions that reflect current budget
constraints.
The futures projected by these
requirements models envision little change
from the status quo. The baseline model for
commercial, civil, and military needs for
space systems takes the approach that current
U.S. programs and facilities, for example,
large ELVs, communication satellites, and
Earth-observing satellites, are adequate for
current and near-term future needs. The
baseline model assumes that the present fleet
of Space Shuttles and ELVs, with modest
upgrades, will be used through 2023. While
one or more new families of small, low-cost
launch vehicles are assumed to become
operational during this decade, no new large
launch vehicles are assumed for the next three
decades. Since the baseline requirements
model contains no new major missions or
vehicles, the NFS task team assumes that no
major changes in launch facilities or research
facilities are needed. Similarly, no significant
advances in space technology are viewed as
necessary.
While the excursion requirements model
is somewhat more forward-looking, the
committee believes that the NFS authors were
unduly cautious. The excursions presented
contain missions that have been previously
advocated but would require major funding
increments and are beyond the scope of a
level-of-effort space program, as well as new
large launch vehicles in the 2003-2008 time
period. Specifically, the following new
launch vehicles are assumed:
1. A new nonpiloted cargo vehicle in the
commercial sector;
2. A new highly reusable launch vehicle
for crew and cargo in the civilian government
sector; and
3. A new nonpiloted cargo vehicle in the
defense sector.
The impacts of the excursion model are
not addressed in depth by the NFS. The
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study points out that facilities required to
support implementation of the launch system
excursion, which includes a new single-
stage-to-orbit launch vehicle, are dependent
on the specific configuration being
developed. It then states that the requirements
of most concepts can be met by modifications
to existing facilities. Regarding R&D facil-
ities, it states that mission model excursions
can be met mostly by upgrades and/or
modifications to existing facilities. The study
notes that manned planetary missions would
require new facilities, with the most costly
being those required for nuclear propulsion
development.
Assessment of Mission Requirements
Models
The baseline model is not deemed by the
committee to be adequate as a basis for long-
term planning. As noted above, the model is
based on other recent studies and conforms to
current budgetary and political decisions. It
assumes that the status quo will be main-
tained for the next 30 years. In fact, it is
much more likely that the space program will
undergo major changes in direction and scope
during that period. The committee believes
that the excursion model is more indicative of
what is likely to be needed during this 30-
year period since it explores the development
of some new facilities and technology. A
fundamental question arising from an assess-
ment of the NFS baseline model is, "What
are the possible long-term outcomes of the
baseline assumptions?" The committee
suggests the following:
• With no new ELVs or changes in
launch facilities, continued operational
inefficiencies will drive up launch costs,
thereby squeezing out investment in new
payloads. For both the military and civil
space programs, launches will be much more
expensive than they could or should be.
• As foreign entities continue to build
relatively cheap and reliable launch
capabilities, utilization of existing U.S. ELVs
will clearly diminish. Due to time and cost
advantages, a number of U.S. entities are
already launching satellites using foreign
launch facilities. This trend will continue in
the absence of domestic development of new,
medium- or large-payload launch vehicles
and capabilities.
• Although the development of small-
payload, low-cost ELVs is reasonable as a
baseline assumption, the committee believes
that this type of vehicle is not likely to capture
a large share of the overall worldwide launch
market and will not have significant impact
on facilities requirements.
• Simply continuing the status quo with
modest upgrades of radio-frequency geosta-
tionary telecommunications satellite systems
and Earth-observing/remote-sensing systems
could lead to a situation similar to that of
large ELVs: foreign development could over-
take U.S. dominance in satellite operations.
None of these potential outcomes is out-
lined in the NFS report. The implications of
the baseline model for U.S. space autonomy,
economic competitiveness, and national
security have not been clearly defined.
Assessment of Facility Requirements
The committee is concerned that the
baseline and excursion requirements models
presented in the report have resulted in
inadequate treatment of operations facilities.
Based on the models, no new operations
facilities were deemed to be required, no
major upgrades or modifications to
operations facilities were proposed, and no
potential innovative approaches were
explored. This criticism is especially relevant
to launch facilities.
The present U.S. launch facilities were
originally constructed as development facil-
ities as part of the evolving U.S. space
program. In their design, with the exception
of the Space Shuttle, little emphasis was
placed on operational efficiency. Compared
with modern launch facilities such as the
Arianespace launch complex in Kourou,
U.S. launch facilities are antiquated,
inefficient, costly to operate, and require
extremely large work forces. 16 In order for
the United States to compete in the world
16 See also. Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
From Earth to Orbit: An Assessment of Transportation
Options, Washington: National Academy Press, 1992.
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launch vehicle market, major upgrades and
revisions are required to incorporate modern
automation and information technologies and
to streamline payload integration and launch
procedures.
This issue is not addressed in the present
study. In fact, a major overall goal of the
NFS is not addressed: "To allow us to impact
external budget submissions, as appropriate
•..to ensure...the proper infrastructure for
our nation's aerospace industry to remain the
world's leader."17 Because the baseline
model (and current policy) emphasizes
maintaining the status quo, the costs
associated with current launch inefficiencies
are not recognized and the lessons possible
from reviewing the operations of modern
launch facilities abroad are not included in the
analysis• Such a critical evaluation is
necessary to develop effective recommen-
dations to ensure competitive U.S. launch
capabilities in the future.
Recommendations
Based on this assessment of the mission
and requirements models and the analysis of
facilities needs based on the models, the
committee recommends the following:
Because 30 years without any new launch
vehicle is not realistic, the baseline require-
ments model should be revised to include a
major new launch vehicle or family of
vehicles• For each vehicle, requirements for
assembly facilities, payload integration
facilities, launch pad, and mission operations
facilities should be assessed to maximize
operational effectiveness. This vehicle family
could encompass all the missions that are
presently captured by the new nonpiloted
cargo vehicle in the Commercial Space
excursion model and the taew highly reusable
launch cargo vehicle in the DoD excursion
model. A number of possible approaches are
currently being evaluated to upgrade and
modernize U.S. launch capabilities, including
single stage to orbit, liquid and solid
technologies, and hybrids of the two.
17 Letter from Daniel Goldin, NASA Administrator, to
Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
November 13, 1992.
Regardless of the technology employed, any
new vehicle line should be designed from the
outset to be an operational system using
revised management practices, as well as new
automation and information technologies, to
minimize the required personnel. In addition,
the technologies used should be sufficiently
robust to minimize the risk of problems that
could ground the fleet•
A follow-on study should assess the
long-term trade-off between modifying
present operational facilities and constructing
new innovative operational facilities to
achieve the launch cost reductions that are
mentioned in the revised requirements
models• A new set of R&D facility require-
ments, consistent with the revised require-
ments models, should be developed and
presented to the NFS oversight group.
Also, a new set of required operational
facility upgrades and construction, consistent
with the new launch vehicles and the study
mentioned above, should be developed and
presented to the NFS oversight group. In the
case of planetary missions, facility needs
should not be predicated on the sole
assumption that nuclear propulsion will be
used. Instead, facility needs corresponding to
other viable approaches (e.g., chemical/
aerobraking for manned missions, solar
electric propulsion for cargo missions, use of
in situ resources for propellant and other
consumables) should be presented in a set of
options along with those corresponding to
nuclear propulsion.
ROLES, MISSIONS, AND
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The NFS accomplished the most
complete cataloging and assessment of space
facilities to date. However, the changes
recommended by the NFS may represent
only the tip of the iceberg of potential
savings. The financial calculations used to
estimate savings from closures and
consolidations are based only on avoiding the
costs of facilities operations. Significant
savings and improvements in the effective-
ness of capacity utilization and future
investment decisions could be achieved if the
study were expanded to consider changes in
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program management and in roles and
missions between agencies.
The NFS did include a working group to
address the need to review the roles and
functions of different agencies. It recognized
that realignment of roles and missions may be
key to major, visionary changes in national
space activities. There is brief mention of
these issues and suggestions for further
review, but they do not receive the attention
this committee believes they deserve consid-
ering the potentially high payoff. The
committee recognizes, however, that effective
realignment of agency roles and missions
would require strong leadership from the
White House.
Roles and Missions of NASA Centers
One area not specifically addressed in the
NFS report concerns opportunities to
consolidate activities of the NASA Centers,
which have numerous overlaps in facilities
and capabilities. For example, there are flight
operations at Johnson Space Center, Marshall
Space Flight Center, Goddard Space Flight
Center, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and
other locations. Similarly, a number of
centers conduct work on space robotics,
sometimes without a critical mass. Ames
Research Center and Johnson Space Center
both have historically performed work in the
life science field, and they have developed
separate space suits. Such overlaps evolved
during a period of robust budgets. With the
current budget constraints, most of this
duplication probably is not justified, though
some may be warranted to provide desirable
redundant capabilities and to stimulate com-
petition and innovation. Consolidation would
allow personnel reductions and save on
facility operations.
In assessing possible consolidation of
NASA centers, however, care should be
taken not to consider facility costs as the only
decision criterion. Only similar operations
with common operational philosophies
should be colocated. For example, at
Johnson Space Center, crew and hardware
safety is the driving requirement. Placing
science and experiment operations with the
same group may result in more complex
procedures, because there may be a tendency
to apply the same requirements and processes
across the board.
Shuttle Operations
Early drafts of the NFS report included a
recommendation by the Space Operations
working group to eliminate use of
Rockwell's Palmdale plant for Shuttle
assembly, modifications, and inspection, and
for thermal protection system tile and blanket
production. These activities would be moved
to Kennedy Space Center (KSC). As a result
of a request by Congress to reassess the
decision to close Palmdale, the final NFS
report removed this recommendation, instead
suggesting that the issue receive further
study. 18 This decision should not cause
NASA to abandon the idea of consolidating
most Shuttle hardware activities at KSC.
Further study should include estimates of the
savings in facilities and programs that could
occur through such consolidation. These are
far more substantial than the annual savings
previously estimated based on direct cost
avoidance only: $1.5 million in occupancy
costs and $35-40 million in operations
labor. _9
NASA is not planning to build additional
orbiters. Most of the flight hardware is at
KSC and with time the expertise on the
hardware will migrate to where the hardware
is operated. Moving the management of the
systems to the operating location would have
the effect of making management more
operationally oriented. The move from a
development to operational philosophy would
result in lower cost over time. However, the
long-term value of making KSC more
operationally oriented is not recognized in the
NFS report, so the potential savings from
such a programmatic change are not
discussed.
18 On March 15, 1994, NASA announced that all major
modifications to Shuttle will continue to be made at
Palmdale. following a detailed analysis of the savings
, from moving the work to KSC.
"' 19 Savings estimates made by the Manufacturing
Working Group. Space Operations Facilities Task Group.
in a draft category I A recommendation of No_,ember 16.
1993.
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This example is a good illustration of the
factors beyond short-term operating costs that
affect closure and consolidation decisions.
Strong political pressures can be brought to
bear to keep any federal facility operating
after its usefulness has ended. To overcome
such pressures, an approach similar to that of
the recent Base Realignment and Closure
Commission would appear to be reasonable.
Air Force Launch Operations
The Air Force has made major
organizational changes by separating
development and operations of space launch
systems. It has established an Air Force
operating squadron for each of the three
launch vehicles: Titan, Atlas, and Delta. Each
squadron oversees the actual operations that
are managed by different development
contractors. None of these vehicles was
originally designed to optimize operations,
and mechanisms to make them more opera-
tional should be explored. For instance,
designating a single operations contractor for
all systems could result in significant savings
assuming current impediments to such an
approach could be overcome. Based on the
Space Shuttle experience--shuttle operations
are not managed by the developer--such a
change could be made with no loss of
reliability or availability.
Management Considerations
Many recent studies regarding the U,S.
competitive posture in the launch vehicle
market point to differences in the manage-
ment approaches used in other countries. For
example, a NASA comparison of the
Ariane V solid rocket motor development
with that of the U.S. Advanced Solid Rocket
Motor shows very similar design and
technology but much lower development and
production costs for Ariane. 2° Part of this
cost difference is due to differences in
missions and the level of political
20 Russ Bardos, "A Comparison of Ariane 5(Solid) vs.
Shuttle Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM)
Development/Production." briefing to the NRC
Committee on Space Facilities, February 7. 1994.
involvement, but management philosophy
and certification requirements are also major
cost drivers in the United States. A committee
of congressional staff members reached
similar conclusions. 21
Roles and Missions Between
Agencies
In view of the budget pressures on both
NASA and DoD, changes in their respective
roles and missions should be studied further.
An important example concerns KSC and the
Air Force 45th Space Wing at Cape
Canaveral. Now sharing a common strip of
government property, they share the same
primary purpose: successful launch of space
vehicles. The NFS views favorably the
shared contracts between the two organiza-
tions and commends the coordination
achieved through the Air Force/NASA liaison
team at the Cape. However, the study does
not consider whether additional savings could
be achieved were the base operations of the
launch facilities at Cape Canaveral merged.
Such a management change deserves further
study to identify specific areas in which a
merger would make sense and to estimate the
potential economies.
If such consolidations were implemented,
it should be strictly for base operations and
separated from the development organizations
of both agencies. It should focus on
maintenance, logistics, and personnel
requirements that are common to both
customers, regardless of the vehicle being
launched. Examples of savings might include
a single management structure, one guard
force, one fire-fighting force, and one
contractor for base operations.
Recommendations
Using the recommendations in the NFS
as a baseline, additional study is needed of
the total savings possible from effective
consolidation and management streamlining
of NASA and DoD space programs. This
21 Terry Dawson, "Space Launch Oversight Trip
Report--August 23-September 3. 1993." briefing to the
committee. March 9, 1994.
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expanded study will undoubtedly indicate that
greater savings are possible when appropriate
program changes are taken into account and
will make the closing of any facility easier to
justify.
NASA and DoD should initiate in-depth
analyses of their respective roles and
missions. Opportunities to increase the total
effectiveness of national space efforts, as
well as to improve efficiencies at specific
facilities, should be identified and appropriate
actions initiated. Integration of operational
responsibilities should be achieved wherever
possible. This process should be overseen by
the Executive Office of the President.
Because a broad revision of roles and
missions would result in extensive changes in
facilities requirements and workloads, and
would likely raise political concerns, consid-
eration should be given to establishing a
presidential commission, analogous to the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission,
to help generate the political consensus
necessary to implement some facilities
closure and consolidation recommendations.
INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION
Another shortcoming of the NFS analysis
of space R&D and operations facilities is that,
unlike the analysis of aeronautics facilities, it
did not include industry representatives to
help evaluate several issues important to both
industry and government. This inconsistency
prompted the committee to question the task
team's level of understanding of industry
concerns about right-sizing space facilities
and the economic and competitive impact of
any policy changes resulting from the final
report of the NFS.
Because the NFS focused on
government-owned facilities, the study has
not taken adequate account of major private
facilities. There is no analysis of how
facilities in industry compare with each other
or with comparable facilities in government,
in terms of age, capabilities, cost, level of
use, support requirements, and other factors.
Such an assessment would be very valuable
for generating a comprehensive, long-term
plan for space facilities.
Further, neither the mission model nor
the analysis of facilities to support the
mission model provided sufficient consid-
eration of commercial ventures in the private
sector. Many aerospace contractors are taking
their strong core competencies to the
commercial marketplace to offset cuts in the
federal budget. The use of existing space
facilities in the pursuit of commercial
activities needs to be encouraged.
This relative inattention to private
facilities in the NFS is apparently due to the
belief by the task groups that market forces
would dictate decisions on private facilities.
Although the aerospace industry is going
through a period of significant consolidation
as a result of reduced defense spending, eco-
nomic incentives are such that considerable
excess capacity in space facilities may
remain. The industry is concerned with the
economics of space facility closure, regarding
both financial liability considerations and
future business. Appropriate legislation could
eliminate the tax liabilities and provide
economic incentives for mothballing or
closing a space facility. Further, companies
must be assured that closing facilities would
not disadvantage them in future contract
competitions. Much better access to
remaining facilities, whether government or
industry owned, must be assured before
contractors will be sufficiently confident to
close their underused facilities.
Although an individual company's
facilities may be required for the company to
appear competitive to the U.S. government
on any future procurement, the prospects for
future government work are dim and
uncertain. Industry well understands that the
major share of U.S. space efforts is con-
trolled by the government. Thus, company
initiatives to close, modernize, or replace
facilities can only be undertaken with appro-
priate government incentives and some
assurances that government-sponsored
demand will be reasonably predictable. It is
essential, therefore, that proposed solutions
to reduce the number of space facilities be
derived through close cooperation with
industry, recognizing industrial constraints
and concerns. Even more important,
assurances are needed that government will
not undertake its own initiatives that compete
with those of private industry.
These issues may be responsible for the
relatively sparse participation by industry in
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the facilities inventory. Contractors may be
concerned that if their facilities are included in
the inventory, they would be more likely to
be targeted for closure or consolidation,
thereby placing the company in a disad-
vantaged position for winning future
business. This issue can only be addressed
by having much broader participation by
industry representatives in the analysis and
decision-making process.
Recommendations
The post Cold War de-emphasis on space
research and its effects on the space industry
should be closely monitored. Therefore,
concerted efforts are needed to enhance
industry participation in the space R&D and
operations aspects of the NFS, to match its
participation in the aeronautics study.
Industrial representatives could assist in
identifying the trade-offs necessary to
determine which industry facilities are needed
in the future, which facilities should be
retired, and which should be extensively
modified. Therefore, the committee strongly
recommends the following:
The NASA/DoD study should continue
into a second phase with strong involvement
from the aerospace industry. In addition, it
would be useful to include representatives
with expertise in economics, tax policy, and
policies affecting commercial use of space.
If a second phase is added to the study,
every effort should be made to evaluate the
degree to which facilities can enhance the
ability to effectively achieve future missions.
One approach that should be considered is to
develop a comparative matrix of capabilities
with an assigned merit system that values
each facility according to its ability to meet
future program requirements. There should
not be any bias towards government facilities
in making total or partial closure
recommendations. Where possible, future
mission models should be defined to include
consideration of commercial uses of space.
The NASA/DoD interagency team should
address the economic and business
development incentives and disincentives
facing private contractors when they consider
closing, mothballing, or building facilities.
Specific policy changes should be identified
that would encourage rationalization of
private facilities by making decisions on
facilities financially attractive.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
AND COOPERATION
A fact inadequately considered by the
NFS is that modern space facilities exist
throughout the world. Many foreign launch
facilities are newer and, having benefited
from American experience, are designed for
operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
Over the next 30 years, foreign capabilities
will undoubtedly continue to improve and
expand. Foreign facilities will affect U.S.
space operations and R&D efforts either by
providing opportunities for cooperation or by
creating sources of competition for U.S.
facilities and setting standards for cost,
reliability, and capability. Foreign develop-
ments, therefore, should be factored into
future U.S. facilities planning.
Foreign Capabilities
Among spacefaring nations other than the
United States, Russia has the most
experience and the largest, most compre-
hensive space program. For many years, the
space program of the former Soviet Union
was designed to create national prestige and
to support military security. Since the end of
the Cold War, the Russian space program has
been evolving along two tracks.
First, to raise money, Russia has made
available for sale to the world a significant
amount of technology as well as hardware
and launch services. These include new
technology such as Stationary Plasma
Thrusters, as well as existing hardware
including Proton boosters, rocket engines,
and Soyuz modules.
Second, Russia has continued the space
station program started with Mir and evolved
it into an international space station program
with the United States. This program is
motivated not only by economics but also by
national prestige and as a way to cement ties
with the United States. It is reasonable to
assume that the Russian effort in space will
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continue along these two tracks for some
time.
The European Space Agency and various
national space programs have built a modem
space capability for Europe. Europe is
heavily involved in international cooperative
programs with the United States and Russia.
These programs range from various types of
scientific satellites to participation in the
international space station. Part of the
European program, therefore, is geared to
cooperative ventures. However, the
European Space Agency has developed the
Ariane 4 ELV and is developing the Ariane 5.
In 1993, Ariane 4 was the commercial market
leader, with seven commercial satellite
launches. In the area of satellites, companies
such as British Aerospace, Matra Marconi
Space, and Alenia have significant capa-
bilities in manufacturing communication
satellites. Therefore, parts of the European
national programs form significant compe-
tition for the United States.
The Chinese space program offers low-
cost services for launching satellites. The
prices offered on these launchers are
significantly lower than comparable U.S.
launchers. Despite pending trade agreements
requiring the Chinese to sell Long March
rockets on a par with Western bids, they have
been underbidding by 30 percent. 22 A new
agreement is expected to be negotiated this
year, but the Chinese will remain important
competition for future commercial launches.
The Japanese continue to develop
indigenous satellite technologies. Their
announced strategy is to develop the capa-
bility for autonomous activities in space,
including design and manufacturing, and
actively to promote and participate in space
projects involving international cooperation.
The latter goal is being met through involve-
ment in the international space station and
several international scientific missions. The
Japanese space program has recently
achieved its long-stated goal of domestic
autonomy in launchers with the launch of the
H-2 rocket. While it is possible that the
Japanese program may develop a strong and
competitive commercial component, sig-
22 Patrick Seitz, "U.S. Officials Probe Proton, Long
March Pricing Policies," Space News, vol. 5, no. 10,
March 7-13. 1994, p. 12.
nificant difficulties remain to be resolved.
(For instance, the H-2 can be launched only
during two 45-day periods in the winter and
summer, limiting the number of launches to 4
or 5 per year, and the high latitude of the
launch site at 30.2 degrees currently limits the
net payload that can be placed into final
geostationary orbit to 2 tons.)
Competition or Cooperation
The extent to which the United States
should compete or cooperate with foreign
space programs depends on national
objectives and policy. U.S. policy, although
not always clearly stated, can be inferred
from government actions. By examining
U.S. actions in the space market segments
discussed earlier, some interesting conclu-
sions about national policy can be reached.
Human Space Exploration
Sending people into space is becoming
increasingly cooperative due to foreign policy
considerations and domestic funding
constraints. Currently, the most prominent
area of international cooperation is the
international space station. The European
Space Agency, Italy, Japan, and Canada are
developing hardware for integration into the
space station, and Russia and the United
States have agreed to cooperate extensively in
the space station program.
Launch support for human space flight is
becoming as internationally cooperative as the
manned space program itself. Of the 34
projected launches needed to complete
assembly of the space station, 21 currently
are scheduled to be U.S. Shuttle launches
and 13 to be Russian launches. 23 Also, it has
been suggested that Ariane be used to carry
equipment to the space station.
23 Additional flights are projected for use of the space
station prior to completion of assembly. In total, 72
flights are projected through completion of assembly, of
which 28 will be by Shuttle and 44 by various Russian
vehicles. See, NASA Systems Design Review. March
23, 1994.
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Space Science and Applications
International cooperation is extensive in
this segment. Within the international
scientific community, missions are planned to
be complementary whenever possible. The
development of space platforms and scientific
instruments is also designed to maximize the
return on investment. Most scientific satellites
are truly international, with many countries
contributing scientific instruments for a single
mission. It is fairly common for the United
States to provide components and instru-
ments to be integrated into foreign spacecraft
and then tested at foreign facilities.
The International Solar Terrestrial
Physics program alone provides a number of
examples. For instance, for the Solar
Heliospheric Observatory, the United States
is providing the Michaelson Doppler
Interferometer for solar seismology, an
Ultraviolet Coronal Spectrograph, and a
White Light Coronagraph. These instruments
will be integrated by Matra and tested at the
Centre National d'Etudes Spatial facility in
Toulouse, France.
Military and Intelligence Satellites
The national capability to design, build,
and operate this class of satellite must be
maintained, independent of any foreign
assistance. The United States will therefore
maintain all facilities required to support its
military and intelligence missions. Inter-
national cooperation will be very limited.
Commercial Space Systems
The commercial satellite business is
driven by cost and new technology. The
United States has a substantial lead in
payload technology and spacecraft design,
which are the critical factors in determining
competitiveness in the market. This market is
much like the commercial aircraft market in
that companies must invest in the required
technology if they are to maintain market
share. Similarly, to gain foreign sales,
contract bids increasingly will be made by
international teams of companies and include
more foreign suppliers. Overall, international
competition is much more prevalent than
cooperation in the commercial space market.
The emerging subsection of the com-
mercial market, micro satellites and their
associated small launch vehicles, remains
immature and difficult to predict. So far,
decisions seem to be driven by commercial
factors, and the United States is developing
market leadership. Here, also, international
competition is likely to become more
prevalent than cooperation.
Launch Vehicles
In this market segment, recent federal
budget constraints are such that modifications
and improvements to launch systems have
been limited to those that have near-term
payoff or are required to replace obsolete
components that cannot be procured or
maintained. These budget constraints are
reflected in the mission requirements models
in the NFS. As stated previously, the
committee believes that this lack of invest-
ment in launch vehicles will result in the
United States losing its remaining commercial
satellite launch business to foreign launch
vehicles, and in the remaining U.S. govern-
ment customers paying more than world
prices for launch services.
The current environment of competition
with foreign launchers may, therefore, give
way to greater international cooperation on
launch facilities and vehicles. 24 As a word of
caution, if the United States turns to foreign
launch services, it would probably take even
longer for the U.S. industry to recover, if
necessary, than after the decision to use only
the Space Shuttle for launching satellites.
Conclusions
In virtually every aspect of the space
market, foreign capabilities are improving. In
24 Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., president and chief executive
officer of The Aerospace Corporation, presented the
notion of an international cooperative effort for
development of the next generation reusable launch
vehicle in a speech at the U.S. Space Foundation
Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 6,
1994.
26 Space Facilities: Meeting Future Needs
two sectors, human space exploration and
space science, better foreign capabilities make
international cooperation advantageous and
are a cost-effective approach to meeting both
U.S. and international objectives. In the other
sectors, especially in launch vehicles,
competition is prevalent. Based on current
policies, foreign launch vehicles and facilities
will continue to set the world standard and
therefore gain more of the world market.
U.S. government launches will remain in the
country but face a cost penalty that may
eventually force more use of foreign
launches, with the likely notable exception of
military and intelligence payloads. Foreign
R&D facilities also will continue to improve,
perhaps providing cost advantages in this
area as well.
Given current international trends, any
comprehensive, long-term evaluation of U.S.
facilities needs must consider foreign
capabilities. Major foreign facilities should be
included in the inventory, including data on
their capabilities, usage, and costs, and on
comparable facilities in the United States.
Just as with domestic facilities, major
foreign capabilities should be consistently
tracked to provide credible assessments of the
current state of the art in various types and
classes of facilities. In cases where foreign
facilities set the world standard, assessments
should be made regarding whether a similar
capability is needed in the United States or
whether sufficient access to secure use of the
foreign facility is available to domestic users.
In some cases, it may be appropriate and
feasible for a U.S. contractor to purchase or
to acquire operational control of a foreign
facility. 25
25 For example, an American company recently acquired
operational control of the German Space Test Facility
near Munich.
5Summary of Recommendations
Based on the assessment of the NFS by
the Committee on Space Facilities, several
recommendations for improvement and
continued study have been made. In virtually
every case, the committee's recommendations
are driven by the clear need to be more
realistic both in recognizing current incentives
and disincentives in the aerospace industry
and in forecasting future conditions for U.S.
space activities. In today's budget-conscious
environment, it is natural that the NFS
focused on cost reduction and consolidations.
Yet, such a study is only useful to future
planning if it gives equal weight to guiding
the direction of future facilities needed to
satisfy legitimate national aspirations. Even in
the context of cost reduction through facilities
closures and consolidations, the study is
timid in recognizing and proposing program
changes and realignments of roles and
missions to capture what could be significant
savings and increased effectiveness. With
this context in mind, the committee makes the
following 11 recommendations:
Recommendation 1. Because 30 years
without any new launch vehicle is not
realistic, the baseline requirements model
should be revised to include a major new
launch vehicle or family of vehicles. For each
vehicle, requirements for assembly facilities,
payload integration facilities, launch pad, and
mission operations facilities should be
assessed to maximize operational effec-
tiveness. This vehicle family could
encompass all the missions that are presently
captured by the new nonpiloted cargo vehicle
in the NFS commercial space excursion
model and the new highly reusable launch
cargo vehicle in the DoD excursion model. A
number of possible approaches are currently
being evaluated to upgrade and modernize
U.S. launch capabilities, including single
stage to orbit, liquid and solid technologies,
and hybrids of the two. Regardless of the
technology employed, any new vehicle line
should be designed from the outset to be an
operational system using revised management
practices, as well as new automation and
information technologies, to minimize the
required personnel complement. In addition,
the technologies used should be sufficiently
robust to minimize the risk of problems that
could ground the fleet.
Recommendation 2. A follow-on study
should be performed to assess the long-term
trade-off between modifying present
operational facilities and constructing new
innovative operational facilities to achieve the
launch cost reductions mentioned in the
revised requirements models. A new set of
R&D facility requirements, consistent with
the requirements models, should be
developed and presented to the NFS
oversight group.
Recommendation 3. A new set of
required operational facility upgrades and
construction, consistent with the new launch
vehicles and the study mentioned above,
should be developed and presented to the
NFS oversight group.
Recommendation 4. Using the recom-
mendations in the NFS as a baseline, addi-
tional study is needed of the total savings
possible from effective consolidation and
management streamlining of NASA and DoD
space programs. This expanded study will
undoubtedly indicate that greater savings are
possible when appropriate program changes
are taken into account and will make the
closing of any facility easier to justify.
Recommendation 5. NASA and DoD
should initiate in-depth analyses of their
individual roles and missions. Opportunities
to increase the total effectiveness of national
space efforts, as well as to improve
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efficiencies at specific facilities, should be
identified and appropriate actions initiated.
Integration of operational responsibilities
should be achieved wherever possible. This
process should be overseen by the Executive
Office of the President.
Recommendation 6. Because a broad
revision of roles and missions would result in
extensive changes in facilities requirements
and workloads, and would likely raise
political concerns, consideration should be
given to establishing a presidential
commission, analogous to the Base Realign-
ment and Closure Commission, to help
generate the political consensus necessary to
implement some facilities closure and
consolidation recommendations.
Recommendation 7. The NASA/DoD
study should continue into a second phase
with strong involvement from the aerospace
industry. In addition, it would be useful to
include representatives with expertise in
economics, tax policy, and policies affecting
commercial use of space.
Recommendation 8. If a second phase is
added to the study, every effort should be
given to evaluate the degree to which facilities
can enhance the ability to effectively achieve
future missions. One approach that should be
considered is to develop a comparative matrix
of capabilities with an assigned merit system
that values each facility according to its ability
to meet future program requirements. There
should not be any bias toward government
facilities in making total or partial closure
recommendations. Where possible, future
mission models should be defined to include
consideration of commercial uses of space.
Recommendation 9. The NASA/DoD
interagency team should address the
economic and business development
incentives and disincentives facing private
contractors when they consider closing,
mothballing, or building facilities. Specific
policy changes should be identified that
would encourage rationalization of private
facilities by making decisions on facilities
financially attractive.
Recommendation 10. Given current inter-
national trends, any comprehensive, long-
term evaluation of U.S. facilities needs must
consider foreign capabilities. Major foreign
facilities should be included in the inventory,
including data on their capabilities, usage,
and costs, and on comparable facilities in the
United States.
Recommendation 11. Just as with
domestic facilities, foreign capabilities should
be consistently tracked to provide credible
assessments of the current state of the art in
various types and classes of major facilities.
In cases where foreign facilities set the world
standard, assessments should be made
regarding whether a similar capability is
needed in the United States or whether
sufficient access to secure use of the foreign
facility is available to domestic users.
In closing, the Committee on Space
Facilities believes important first steps have
been taken toward assessing and streamlining
space R&D and operations facilities.
However, extensive follow-up measures are
needed to take advantage of existing
opportunities both to cut costs and to
modernize the U.S. space infrastructure.
Appendix A: Statement of Task
The United States is increasingly
challenged by advances in technologies that
will affect its global competitiveness in
virtually all economic sectors. Preeminent
among these are advances in aerospace
technology. Technological advances are
paced by modern, highly productive research
and development (R&D), and operational
facilities. An interagency task force is
conducting a study of national space R&D
and operational facilities in order to develop a
National Facilities Plan. This plan is
scheduled to be developed by spring, 1994.
The Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board (ASEB) has been requested to review
the interagency facilities plan in two phases.
To fulfill this request, the ASEB proposes to
assemble a committee of approximately 12
senior experts with a broad knowledge of
space R&D, operations, and their associated
facilities.
In Phase I the Committee will:
• Review and critique the requirements
presented in the national facilities plan for
space R&D and operations.
• Review and critique the facility
approaches presented in the national facility
plan, focusing on technical issues.
• Assess the extent to which the
interagency task force has considered
alternative facility approaches and alternative
ways that recommended facility needs might
be addressed, such as by the joint use of
industry and government facilities, or by
pooling resources internationally in the
construction of new facilities or in new
practices that would make the use of foreign
facilities more amenable.
• Assess whether the interagency
conclusions and recommendations are
adequately supported by evidence and
analyses;
• Recommend any further actions or
studies that should be pursued by the
interagency group.
Phase II anticipates that continued
facilities planning, from a broader
perspective, will be required following
Phase I. In Phase II, the Committee will:
• Identify a set of possible major federal
and commercial initiatives for coming
decades, and identify the options that could
enable appropriate facility development to
address those initiatives.
• Examine the potential effect of various
facilities decisions in either enabling or
foreclosing future space program options.
• Consider innovative approaches to
meeting facility needs beyond the interagency
approach, including potential use of foreign
facilities.
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Appendix B: Major Recommendations of the National Facilities Study
AERONAUTICS 26
Two new wind tunnels should be
constructed by 2002 for commercial jet
transport development. Non-traditional
approaches should be considered for
obtaining this critically needed capability.
Legislation patterned after the "Unitary Plan,"
which was enacted previously for commer-
cially oriented wind tunnel acquisition, is one
option. Tax incentives are another. Since the
new capability is targeted so strongly toward
industry needs, industry could have a much
greater involvement in the venture.
Geographical location of the new wind
tunnels merits careful consideration because
they are expected to be in service for decades.
A "level playing field" should be established
to evaluate various locations on their technical
merits with strong weighting of factors which
help keep operating costs low.
SPACE
Seventy recommended options for im-
proved effectiveness should be considered
for implementation. They can be accom-
plished without significant roles and mission
changes. The responsible organizations
should review the NFS consolidation closure
findings in Volumes 4 and 5 and develop
implementation plans for each option.
Representatives from the NFS Task Groups
will assist in the process as desired.
The government and aerospace industry
can take additional steps to streamline and
26This appendix is quoted directly from, National
Facilities Study Summary Report, April 29, 1994, p.
23.
focus the Nation's space facilities in this
austere budget environment.
National facility planning is clearly
affected by national objectives which are
being reshaped in recognition of the changing
needs in defense and in the civil and
commercial sectors. The need exists for a
national vision and underlying policy for
space. It was observed that during this period
of dramatic downsizing of all participating
departments and agencies, the roles and
missions of the agencies as currently
established has, in some cases, produced an
overlap of functions and responsibilities.
This was a limiting factor in defining some
facility improvements or savings/decommis-
sioning. Nonetheless, the review concen-
trated on the best technical approaches and
opportunities which might guide future
strategic planning. The agency heads may
want to jointly review overlapping functions
and responsibilities to determine if and where
greater efficiencies/cost reduction could result
without impacting negatively on the agency
missions.
The NASA/DoD/Commercial Mission
and Requirements Model document should
have long-term value for organizations
developing strategic plans involving facilities
and their usage. The mission model should
be updated annually and made available to
organizations involved in the planning
process.
GENERAL
Facility pricing presents barriers
Although charging policy variations did
not have a first order effect on facility
31
PAGE P. AIb_ RIOT lrILMEID
32 Space Facilities: Meeting Future Needs
recommendations, facility charging policies
merit a more systematic look than was
possible in the current study. For example,
charging policies for launch industry's
decisions on use of government facilities.
Facility pricing and practices of DoD, DOC,
DOE, and NASA should be the subject of an
in-depth review with the objective of
developing uniform policy that encourages
the most cost-effective commercial and
interagency shared use of U.S. government
facilities.
NFS Inventory should be utilized
An up-to-date facilities database is needed
when program and budget decisions are
made. Effort should be made to collect data
missing from NFS Database and thus
maximize its value as a unique reference
asset. The database should be institu-
tionalized in a proper form and maintained by
the affected agencies on a permanent basis for
future reference by both government and,
where appropriate, industry. The database
will prove particularly useful to the organi-
zations responsible for implementing the
NFS facility disposition recommendations
and will assist in making decisions regarding
the need for facilities.
Multi-agency facility coordination
process is needed
NASA, DoD, DoE agency-level proc-
esses should be modified to promote
systematic assessment of cost-effective
facilities utilization. Strengthened agency-
level processes are needed to ensure consid-
eration of interagency options for joint use,
alteration, consolidation and or closure. The
National Facilities Study should be
institutionalized by assigning a headquarters-
level organization in each agency to be
responsible for facility assessments and
establishing a multi-agency coordination
process for facility use and disposition.
